4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
PaddyandClaude Opus 5	d960ac8e24	Fold the pre-deploy review findings into the calendar cutover ... A fresh-context review before deploying found two things that would have broken production, both in the runbook rather than the code. The deploy order named only migration 003. Production has none of the three - 001 and 002 were only ever applied to the dev database - and the new API reads the columns they add on every request, so following it literally would have 500'd every calendar call including the anonymous feed the public website uses. Step 4 now carries a numbered checklist with a verification query. APP_ORIGINS replaces the code's default list rather than adding to it, so naming calendar.nachklang.art in DEFAULT_APP_ORIGINS is not enough if that variable is set on the vhost - and its failure mode is the quiet one the config already warns about, where everything works except sign-out. Added to the same checklist. Also from the review: The two operands of the read guard on /json/next and /ical were swapped so the password check short-circuits first. They are side-effect free, so the order was free - but the old one put an admin-database query in front of the public feed for any caller holding a .nachklang.art cookie, which is a dependency that feed has never had. Two tests now assert the admin database is not consulted at all. /:calendar/json/next had no route-level test, despite being the endpoint the public website actually calls and the property named as load-bearing. Covered now, along with the rest of its credential matrix. Migrations 001 and 002 gained IF NOT EXISTS. They are applied by hand with no tracking table, so a partial re-run should be a no-op rather than an error that aborts the rest of the paste. Verified by applying all three twice to a throwaway container and diffing against the dev schema. Swagger: two descriptions still claimed authentication was required where the public calendar needs none, the calendar enum omitted `birthdays`, and a `createdBy` request-body field was documented and read but never persisted - misleading in a way that suggests a client can set authorship. Removed. The CORS comment describing the calendar's query-parameter sessions is no longer true and was rewritten. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-06 22:41:49 +02:00
PaddyandClaude Opus 5	b848d6eab9	Move the calendar onto the shared session cookie ... Step 4 of docs/calendar-auth-migration.md, and the close of DEFERRED_SECURITY.md item 1: no calendar route reads sessionId/sessionKey from the query string any more, so a live credential no longer travels through access logs, browser history and Referer headers. The four write routes sit behind requireAppAccess('calendar'), which also narrows who may edit from "any activated @nachklang.art account" to an explicit per-user permission. They answer 401 signed out and 403 without the permission, where they previously answered 403 for both. The three read routes cannot use the middleware: one URL serves an anonymous visitor, an iCal subscription holding a shared password, and a signed-in editor who should see drafts. They resolve the session optionally instead, and a signed-in user without the calendar permission is treated as anonymous rather than refused - so they keep the public calendar access anyone has. That public calendar staying anonymous is load-bearing: nachklang.art reads it to show the next upcoming event. It is now pinned at both the password-table and the route level, and so is the rule that a shared password can never be used to write. credentials.service.ts loses its session half and becomes the password table it always wanted to be. The shared passwords survive only for iCal clients, which cannot send a cookie. Writes record the author as an admin user id and no longer have a legacy int to write, which is what migration 003 makes room for. /calendar/users/* is left in place: nothing calls it and a session it mints opens nothing, but they are still live password-accepting endpoints, so removing them belongs with the rest of the legacy path in step 5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-06 22:23:36 +02:00
PaddyandClaude Opus 5	61d3883479	Read calendar event creators from the admin module, and archive the old ones ... Steps 1 and 3 of docs/calendar-auth-migration.md. The calendar is the last module still authenticating against its own users/sessions tables; this is the groundwork that lets step 4 swap it for the shared admin identity. An event now records its creator twice: created_by_id, the legacy INT into the calendar database's own users table, and created_by_user_id, the admin module's VARCHAR(36) id. The two live in different databases, so there is no foreign key and no join - a cross-schema reference would tie the schemas' lifecycles together, and the name is instead resolved through one lookup per result set against the admin database. The creator is only ever rendered as a name; nothing authorises on it. That is what makes the planned account backfill unnecessary - dropped by decision - and what makes the read degrade rather than fail: an admin id that no longer resolves falls back, and an unreachable admin database costs a name rather than the response. The public calendar is read anonymously by nachklang.art and has never depended on the admin database being up. Since there is no backfill, step 5 dropping the legacy users table would have erased the authorship of every pre-cutover event. Migration 002 brings that part of step 5 forward and snapshots the names onto the events themselves, so the data is safe well before the table holding it goes away. The same SELECT and row mapper existed in four copies; collapsed to one of each first, so the dual read is written once rather than four times. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-06 22:09:21 +02:00
Paddy	bf7be65b03	Add admin identity module: better-auth, per-app permissions, invitations (#12) ... Reviewed-on: #12 Co-authored-by: Patrick Müller <mail@pmueller.me> Co-committed-by: Patrick Müller <mail@pmueller.me>	2026-09-06 10:41:54 +00:00