# Deferred Security Issues

These items were identified during a security review on 2026-05-02 and consciously deferred.
**Must be addressed before opening the application to a larger or public userbase.**

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## 1. Session credentials in URL query parameters (logged-in users) — CLOSED 2026-09-06

**Files:** `src/models/calendar/events/events.router.ts` — all GET/PUT/DELETE handlers

`sessionId` and `sessionKey` were read from query parameters, which meant they appeared in
server access logs, browser history, proxy logs, and `Referer` headers.

**Fixed** by step 4 of `docs/calendar-auth-migration.md`: the calendar's write routes now sit
behind `requireAppAccess('calendar')` against the better-auth session cookie, and the read
routes resolve the same cookie optionally. No route reads `sessionId`/`sessionKey` any more,
and the Angular frontend sends `withCredentials` instead of appending them to every URL. That
closed the item outright rather than moving the credential somewhere safer.

Two things this did *not* change, both deliberate:

- The shared calendar `password` parameter stays. An iCal client cannot send a cookie, so
  this is the one caller that genuinely needs a credential in the URL. It grants read access
  to one calendar and nothing else - `test/calendar/events.router.test.ts` pins that it can
  never be used to write.
- The legacy `/calendar/users/*` routes still exist. Nothing calls them any more, and a
  legacy session they mint no longer opens anything, but they are still live
  password-accepting endpoints. Step 5 removes them.

---

## 2. No event ownership check

**Files:** `src/models/calendar/events/events.router.ts`
- `PUT /:eventId` (update)
- `PUT /move/:eventId` (move)
- `DELETE /:eventId` (delete)

Currently any account holding the `calendar` permission can edit, move, or delete any event regardless of who created it. This is acceptable while everyone holding it is a trusted admin.

**Fix (updated 2026-09-06):** fetch the event first and verify `event.createdByUserId === res.locals.admin.id` before allowing the mutation — `createdById`, the legacy INT, is no longer written and is gone at step 5. Rather than an `isAdmin` flag, the bypass belongs in the permission model that already exists: `requireAppAccess('calendar', 'manage')` alongside the current `access` role, which needs a row in `APP_ROLES` on both sides and nothing else.

---

## 3. Activation token has no expiry

> **Superseded for new accounts (2026-09-05).** The admin module
> (`src/models/admin/`) replaced account creation for the feedback, tickets and admin
> apps: accounts now come from `invitations`, whose tokens expire after 7 days and are
> stored only as a SHA-256 hash. The item below still stands for the legacy calendar
> `users` table, which the admin module deliberately left alone - see
> `docs/calendar-auth-migration.md`.

**File:** `src/models/calendar/users/users.service.ts` — `createUser` / `activateUser`

The email activation link is valid indefinitely. Acceptable for a small, trusted userbase.

**Fix:**
1. Add an `activation_expires` column to the `users` table (e.g. `DATETIME`).
2. Set it to `NOW() + INTERVAL 24 HOUR` in `createUser`.
3. Check `activation_expires > NOW()` in `activateUser` before accepting the token.

---

## 4. Password reset token has no expiry

> **Superseded for new accounts (2026-09-05).** Password resets for admin-module accounts
> go through better-auth, whose reset tokens expire after one hour. As with item 3, the
> text below still applies to the legacy calendar `users` table.

**File:** `src/models/calendar/users/users.service.ts` — `initiatePasswordReset` / `finalizePasswordReset`

The reset token stored in `pw_reset_token_hash` never expires. Acceptable for a small, trusted userbase.

**Fix:**
1. Add a `pw_reset_expires` column to the `users` table (e.g. `DATETIME`).
2. Set it to `NOW() + INTERVAL 15 MINUTE` in `initiatePasswordReset`.
3. Check `pw_reset_expires > NOW()` in `finalizePasswordReset` before accepting the token.