Paddy
bf7be65b03
Jenkins Production Deployment
Reviewed-on: #12 Co-authored-by: Patrick Müller <mail@pmueller.me> Co-committed-by: Patrick Müller <mail@pmueller.me>
72 lines
2.7 KiB
Bash
72 lines
2.7 KiB
Bash
# Values containing #, ", \ or surrounding spaces must be single-quoted
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# (dotenv 16 treats an unquoted # as a comment): DB_PASSWORD='abc#def'
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# REQUIRED. The admin module treats anything other than "development" or "test"
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# as production: strict secrets, cross-subdomain cookies, no relaxed CORS.
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# Leaving it unset is therefore safe-by-default but will refuse to boot without
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# the admin secrets below. Set it to development for local work.
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NODE_ENV=development
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PORT=3000
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DB_HOST=
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DB_USER=
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DB_PASSWORD=
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EMAIL_HOST=
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EMAIL_USERNAME=
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EMAIL_PASSWORD=
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CALENDAR_DB=
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FEEDBACK_DB=
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FEEDBACK_IP_SALT=
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FEEDBACK_RATE_LIMIT_MAX=5
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FEEDBACK_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MIN=10
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SALESFORCE_ENABLED=false
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SALESFORCE_API_URL=
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SALESFORCE_CLIENT_ID=
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SALESFORCE_CLIENT_SECRET=
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TICKETS_DB=
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TICKETS_RATE_LIMIT_MAX=10
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TICKETS_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MIN=10
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ADMIN_DB=
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# 32+ random bytes, e.g. `openssl rand -base64 48`. Mandatory outside
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# development/test - there is deliberately no fallback, since a hardcoded one
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# would be a published signing key. Rotating it signs everyone out and
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# invalidates outstanding password-reset links.
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BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=
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API_BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
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ADMIN_APP_URL=http://localhost:3002
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# Comma-separated origins of the apps that may call /admin/* with credentials.
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APP_ORIGINS=http://localhost:3001
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# nachklang.art in production; passkeys are bound to this value.
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PASSKEY_RP_ID=localhost
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# On start-up, makes sure this address can get in (invite, or grant admin if the
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# user already exists). Idempotent, safe to leave set.
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ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_EMAIL=
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# The header the reverse proxy puts the real client IP in, and the proxy hops to
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# trust. Get these right or better-auth cannot resolve a client IP and every
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# request shares ONE rate-limit bucket (/sign-in/* allows 3 per 10 seconds, so
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# one noisy client locks everyone out). Check with:
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# SELECT `key` FROM rateLimit; -- a "no-trusted-ip" row means it is happening.
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# The header the reverse proxy puts the real client IP in. Must be one the proxy
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# actually overwrites - trusting a header it does not set lets any client send its
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# own value and bypass the sign-in rate limit entirely.
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# Set to "none" to trust no header at all: every request then shares one rate-limit
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# bucket, which is the safe fallback if the check below fails. Verify after deploy
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# with: SELECT ipAddress FROM session ORDER BY createdAt DESC LIMIT 3;
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CLIENT_IP_HEADERS=x-real-ip
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TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS=
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# Writes invitation links to the log. That link is a live account-creation
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# credential, so this is refused outside development. Needed locally, where the
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# mail relay is off and only the token's hash is stored.
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ADMIN_LOG_INVITE_LINKS=true
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MEMBER_CREDENTIAL=123
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CHOIR_CREDENTIAL=123
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MANAGEMENT_CREDENTIAL=123
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