Files
API/src/models/admin/invitations/invitations.service.ts
T
Paddy dbcd5b56f6 Harden the admin module after a fresh-context review
Six defects found by an independent review of 7aac07a.

Environment handling now fails safe. NODE_ENV=production was gating the
signing key, the cookie domain, the CORS origin list and invitation-token
logging all at once, and it was documented nowhere - an unset value, which is
what a fresh Plesk vhost gives you, silently degraded all four. Only
'development' and 'test' relax anything now; everything else, unset included,
is strict. The hardcoded fallback secret is gone (dev gets a random
per-process one, so no committed value can ever sign a production cookie),
and invitation-link logging is an explicit ADMIN_LOG_INVITE_LINKS opt-in that
is refused in strict mode.

Rate limiting no longer collapses into a single global bucket. Without
trustedProxies, better-auth rejects a multi-value x-forwarded-for, resolves no
client IP, and keys every request to "no-trusted-ip" - where /sign-in/*
allows 3 requests per 10 seconds, so one noisy client could lock the whole
organisation out. CLIENT_IP_HEADERS and TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS make this explicit,
the unspecified x-forwarded-for fallback is gone, and strict mode warns at
boot when no trusted proxy is configured.

Invite acceptance is transactional. The user and its credential account go in
one runWithTransaction, as better-auth's own sign-up route does. A transaction
cannot span the permission and invitation writes - those use this module's own
pool - so a failure there is compensated: the user row is deleted and the
invitation un-marked, so the link works again instead of leaving the invitee
with a burnt token and an account no route can repair.

The last-admin guards were check-then-act. Two admins each removing the
other's admin permission could both pass the check and both commit, leaving
nobody able to administer anything. The count now runs inside the write
transaction under SELECT ... FOR UPDATE.

Also: lastSignInAt filtered expired sessions in the detail endpoint but not
the list, so the two disagreed; and the integration suite never reset
rateLimit, leaving it one added sign-in away from 429s that look like auth
bugs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 18:28:52 +02:00

223 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript

import * as crypto from 'crypto';
import {NachklangAdminDB} from '../Admin.db.js';
import {AppName, APP_NAMES, isAppName} from '../admin.schema.js';
const db = NachklangAdminDB.db;
/**
* Invitations are this API's only path to a new account (there is no public
* sign-up). The raw token exists exactly twice: in the mail we send and in the
* request body when it comes back. What we store is its SHA-256 hash, so a
* database dump does not hand out account access - the same reasoning as the
* calendar module's session key hashing, and the reason lookups go through
* `findByToken` rather than any query on a plaintext column.
*/
export const INVITATION_TTL_DAYS = 7;
export interface OpenInvitation {
id: number;
email: string;
name: string;
apps: AppName[];
invitedBy: string | null;
createdAt: Date;
expiresAt: Date;
}
export interface AcceptableInvitation {
id: number;
email: string;
name: string;
apps: AppName[];
}
const hashToken = (token: string): string => {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex');
};
const generateToken = (): string => {
// 32 bytes, url-safe: it travels in a mail link's query string.
return crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
};
const parseApps = (value: unknown): AppName[] => {
// mysql2 hands back a JSON column already parsed; a driver or column-type
// change that turns it into a string must not break the read path.
const raw = typeof value === 'string' ? JSON.parse(value) : value;
return Array.isArray(raw) ? raw.filter(isAppName) : [];
};
const expiryFromNow = (): Date => {
return new Date(Date.now() + INVITATION_TTL_DAYS * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
};
/**
* Creates an invitation and returns the raw token for the mail. Any earlier
* open invitation for the same address is revoked first: two valid links for
* one mailbox is a needless second live credential, and "resend" would
* otherwise quietly accumulate them.
*/
export const createInvitation = async (
email: string,
name: string,
apps: AppName[],
invitedBy: string | null
): Promise<{id: number; token: string; expiresAt: Date}> => {
const token = generateToken();
const expiresAt = expiryFromNow();
const validApps = Array.from(new Set(apps)).filter(app => APP_NAMES.includes(app));
const id = await db.transaction().execute(async trx => {
await trx
.updateTable('invitations')
.set({revoked_at: new Date()})
.where('email', '=', email)
.where('accepted_at', 'is', null)
.where('revoked_at', 'is', null)
.execute();
const result = await trx
.insertInto('invitations')
.values({
email,
name,
token_hash: hashToken(token),
apps: JSON.stringify(validApps),
invited_by: invitedBy,
created_at: new Date(),
expires_at: expiresAt
})
.executeTakeFirst();
return Number(result.insertId);
});
return {id, token, expiresAt};
};
/**
* Looks up a still-usable invitation by raw token. Callers must not
* distinguish "unknown", "expired", "revoked" and "already accepted" to the
* client: all four answer with the same shape, so a stranger cannot probe which
* tokens ever existed.
*/
export const findByToken = async (token: string): Promise<AcceptableInvitation | null> => {
const row = await db
.selectFrom('invitations')
.select(['id', 'email', 'name', 'apps'])
.where('token_hash', '=', hashToken(token))
.where('accepted_at', 'is', null)
.where('revoked_at', 'is', null)
.where('expires_at', '>', new Date())
.executeTakeFirst();
if (!row) {
return null;
}
return {id: row.id, email: row.email, name: row.name, apps: parseApps(row.apps)};
};
/** Marks the invitation accepted. Conditional on it still being open so two
* concurrent accepts of the same link cannot both create an account. */
export const markAccepted = async (invitationId: number): Promise<boolean> => {
const result = await db
.updateTable('invitations')
.set({accepted_at: new Date()})
.where('id', '=', invitationId)
.where('accepted_at', 'is', null)
.where('revoked_at', 'is', null)
.executeTakeFirst();
return Number(result.numUpdatedRows) > 0;
};
/**
* Reverses markAccepted. Used only to compensate a failed acceptance: the user
* could not be created, so the link must become usable again rather than
* stranding the invitee with a burnt token and no account.
*/
export const unmarkAccepted = async (invitationId: number): Promise<void> => {
await db
.updateTable('invitations')
.set({accepted_at: null})
.where('id', '=', invitationId)
.execute();
};
export const listOpenInvitations = async (): Promise<OpenInvitation[]> => {
const rows = await db
.selectFrom('invitations')
.select(['id', 'email', 'name', 'apps', 'invited_by', 'created_at', 'expires_at'])
.where('accepted_at', 'is', null)
.where('revoked_at', 'is', null)
.where('expires_at', '>', new Date())
.orderBy('created_at', 'desc')
.execute();
return rows.map(row => ({
id: row.id,
email: row.email,
name: row.name,
apps: parseApps(row.apps),
invitedBy: row.invited_by,
createdAt: row.created_at,
expiresAt: row.expires_at
}));
};
export const getOpenInvitation = async (invitationId: number): Promise<OpenInvitation | null> => {
const all = await listOpenInvitations();
return all.find(invitation => invitation.id === invitationId) ?? null;
};
/** Resend issues a *new* token and expiry and invalidates the old one, rather
* than re-mailing the existing link: if the first mail leaked, resending it
* would extend the leak's lifetime. */
export const resendInvitation = async (
invitationId: number
): Promise<{token: string; email: string; name: string; expiresAt: Date} | null> => {
const invitation = await getOpenInvitation(invitationId);
if (!invitation) {
return null;
}
const token = generateToken();
const expiresAt = expiryFromNow();
await db
.updateTable('invitations')
.set({token_hash: hashToken(token), expires_at: expiresAt, created_at: new Date()})
.where('id', '=', invitationId)
.execute();
return {token, email: invitation.email, name: invitation.name, expiresAt};
};
export const revokeInvitation = async (invitationId: number): Promise<boolean> => {
const result = await db
.updateTable('invitations')
.set({revoked_at: new Date()})
.where('id', '=', invitationId)
.where('accepted_at', 'is', null)
.where('revoked_at', 'is', null)
.executeTakeFirst();
return Number(result.numUpdatedRows) > 0;
};
/** Used by the bootstrap to stay idempotent across restarts. */
export const hasOpenInvitationFor = async (email: string): Promise<boolean> => {
const row = await db
.selectFrom('invitations')
.select('id')
.where('email', '=', email)
.where('accepted_at', 'is', null)
.where('revoked_at', 'is', null)
.where('expires_at', '>', new Date())
.executeTakeFirst();
return Boolean(row);
};