Step 5, the last one, of docs/calendar-auth-migration.md. Step 4 is deployed and verified, which is what this was waiting on: it removes the fallbacks that step 4 still leaned on. Gone: src/models/calendar/users/ entirely - registration, login, activation, both password-reset routes, and the session checking that the feedback and tickets admin areas used to authenticate against - along with its mount. That was the API's last unauthenticated account-creation and mail-sending endpoint. A survey confirmed nothing outside that directory imported it and nothing else touched its tables. Also gone: the two joins against the calendar users table in events.service.ts and the created_by_id / version_created_by_id columns they read, from the SQL, the row mapper, the Event interface and the swagger schema; and X-Session-Id / X-Session-Key from the CORS allowedHeaders, which nothing has read since the first cutover and nothing has sent since the second. An event's author still renders, because migration 002 snapshotted the names before this could erase them. That was brought forward from this step on purpose, and it is the reason 004 can rename the accounts aside at all. The accounts are renamed rather than dropped - they still hold e-mail addresses and password hashes, and a rename makes them unreachable without destroying anything. InnoDB rewires the sessions foreign key to the new name; verified on MariaDB 11, along with the whole 001-004 chain from the pre-cutover production schema, which lands byte-identical to a fresh dev database. Migration 004 must be applied AFTER deploying, not before - the reverse of step 4, whose migration only added things. Its own header and the runbook both say so, since getting it wrong by analogy is the obvious mistake. DEFERRED_SECURITY.md items 3 and 4 close with it: the activation and reset tokens that never expired are gone along with the code that issued them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Migrating the Calendar domain onto the admin identity module
Status: complete. Steps 1, 3 and 4 were deployed and verified in production on 2026-09-06; step 2 was dropped by decision and part of step 5 brought forward. Step 5 is implemented and awaiting deploy - see its own checklist below, whose ordering is the opposite of step 4's.
Verified live after step 4: the public calendar still answers anonymously, all 23 public
events kept a resolvable author, restricted calendars still refuse without a credential,
legacy query credentials answer 401, and calendar.nachklang.art is trusted for sign-out.
Written 2026-09-05 alongside the admin module (step 2 of docs/plan-admin-auth.md in the
nachklang-admin repo), which deliberately left the calendar alone. Steps 1-4 of that plan
are now live, so the calendar is the last module still on the legacy query-parameter
sessions.
Why the calendar was left out
The admin module replaced authentication for feedback and tickets by swapping one middleware. The calendar cannot be done that way, because its user identity is woven into its data:
users/sessionslive in the calendar database and are the same tables the feedback and tickets admin areas used to authenticate against.events.created_by_idis an INT foreign key intousers.user_id. The admin module's user ids are VARCHAR(36) strings. Migrating identity means migrating that column and every query that joins it.- The Angular frontend passes
sessionId/sessionKeyas query parameters (DEFERRED_SECURITY.mditem 1). Cookie sessions remove the parameters entirely, so every calendar route signature and the frontend's HTTP layer change together. credentials.service.tsimplements a second, parallel authorisation model: theMEMBER_CREDENTIAL/CHOIR_CREDENTIAL/MANAGEMENT_CREDENTIALshared secrets that let non-users read specific calendars. That has no equivalent in the admin module and is not a per-user permission at all.
What already exists today: calendar is a value in the user_app_permissions.app enum, so
permissions can be granted before anything else moves.
What is in place to build on
- Cookie sessions across
*.nachklang.art, andrequireAppAccess('calendar')insrc/models/admin/admin.middleware.ts- usable the moment a calendar route wants it. res.locals.adminis{id, email, displayName, apps};idis the string user id.- Invitations, disable/enable and session revocation already cover calendar users, because they are properties of the account rather than of an app.
Suggested sequence
Each step is meant to leave production working on its own.
-
Add a bridging column.
Done 2026-09-06, asALTER TABLE events ADD COLUMN created_by_user_id VARCHAR(36) NULL, indexed. Nothing reads it yet.sql/calendar/001_add_admin_user_bridge.sql- the first migration this repo owns for the calendar schema, mirrored intodocker/init/01-calendar-schema-dev.sql. It covers bothevents.created_by_user_idandevent_versions.version_created_by_user_id, and carries no foreign key (see "What the code actually looks like" below). The dev seed leaves two events on the legacy path and gives one an admin id, so step 3's dual-read has both cases to exercise. Verified by applying the pre-migration schema and then the migration to a throwaway MariaDB 11 container, and diffingSHOW CREATE TABLEagainst a fresh dev schema: identical. Applied to the running dev database on the same day; a dev container created before then needs it applied, or recreating. -
Map the accounts.Dropped 2026-09-06. There is no backfill: since the creator is only ever a display name (see below), old events keep resolving through the legacy join until step 5 and then simply lose the name. Re-inviting the people who actually still need calendar access remains an operational task, but it is no longer a migration step and nothing is blocked on it. -
Dual-read.
ChangeDone 2026-09-06.events.service.tsto prefercreated_by_user_idand fall back tocreated_by_id. Writes fill both.events.service.tsnow reads both columns and prefers the admin one, resolving the name through a singlefindDisplayNameslookup against the admin database per result set (added tousers.admin.service.tsfor this). Four copies of the same SELECT and four copies of the row mapper were collapsed into one of each first - the dual read would otherwise have had to be written four times.A name now has three possible sources, tried weakest first: the legacy join, then the
created_by_namesnapshot from migration 002, then the live admin lookup - which wins because it is the only one that follows an account being renamed. An admin id that no longer resolves falls back rather than blanking, and a failure to reach the admin database is caught and logged rather than propagated, so an anonymous read of the public calendar never depends on the admin database being up. Covered bytest/calendar/events.service.test.ts.Writes are not dual-written, contrary to the original plan: before the cutover the request only ever carries a legacy session, so there is no admin id available to write. Writes start filling
created_by_user_id(and stop fillingcreated_by_id) in step 4. -
Switch the routes.
Replace the query-parameter session checks inDone 2026-09-06.events.router.tsandusers.router.tswithrequireAppAccess('calendar'), and change the Angular frontend towithCredentials: true.DEFERRED_SECURITY.mditem 1 is closed: no route readssessionId/sessionKeyany more.How it came out, route by route:
- The four write routes sit behind
requireAppAccess('calendar')as middleware. They answer 401 when signed out and 403 without the permission, where they used to answer 403 for both. - The three read routes cannot use middleware - the same URL serves an anonymous visitor,
an iCal subscription holding a shared password, and a signed-in editor who should see
drafts. They call
resolveAccessoptionally instead (signedInEditorin the router), and a signed-in user without the calendar permission is treated as anonymous rather than refused, so they keep their access to the public calendar. credentials.service.tslost its session half entirely and is now just the password table.hasAccess(calendar, password)./calendar/users/*was left alone. Nothing calls it and a session it mints opens nothing, but they are live password-accepting endpoints - step 5 removes them.
Also:
calendar.nachklang.artjoinedDEFAULT_APP_ORIGINS(better-authtrustedOrigins, without which sign-out from the calendar fails while everything else works), andlocalhost:4200joined the dev origins for the same reason.Two things this step had to carry that the original sequence put in step 5:
sql/calendar/003_allow_null_legacy_creator.sqlmakesevents.created_by_idnullable (MODIFY created_by_id INT NULL). It isNOT NULLtoday, so the first event created after the cutover would otherwise fail to insert - there is no legacy int id to write any more.event_versions.version_created_by_idis already nullable. The foreign key can stay until step 5; it permits NULL. It also re-runs 002's idempotent name backfill, to catch anything created between the two migrations. Applying it early is safe - widening a column to accept NULL cannot break the running pre-cutover build.- The public calendar stays anonymous.
hasAccess('public')returns true before any credential check, and nachklang.art reads/calendar/events/public/jsonand/public/json/nextwith no session at all. Pinned at both levels - the password table intest/calendar/credentials.service.test.ts, the routes themselves intest/calendar/events.router.test.ts- so this cannot regress quietly.
Deploy checklist
Production has none of the three migrations: 001 and 002 were only ever applied to the dev database. The API build below selects
created_by_user_idandcreated_by_nameon every read, so deploying it against a database missing them fails every calendar request including the anonymous public feed the website uses. In order:- Apply
sql/calendar/001,002,003, in that order, againstCALENDAR_DB. All three are re-runnable, so applying one that is already applied is a no-op. Verify before continuing:SHOW COLUMNS FROM events LIKE '%by_user%'; SHOW COLUMNS FROM events LIKE '%by_name%';- four rows across the two tables, and
created_by_idnullable.
- four rows across the two tables, and
- Check
APP_ORIGINSon the API vhost.calendar.nachklang.artis in the code's default list, but the environment variable replaces that list rather than adding to it - so if it is set at all (the tickets/feedback cutover may have set it), appendhttps://calendar.nachklang.artor the calendar's sign-out will 403 while everything else works. That is the failure mode the comment inadmin.config.tswarns about. - Deploy the API.
- Deploy the calendar frontend immediately after. Do not leave a gap - see below.
- Re-run 002's two
UPDATEstatements. Between step 1 and step 3 the old API was still writingcreated_by_idwith no snapshot; those few rows would otherwise lose their author at step 5. - Rebuild the admin app if
NEXT_PUBLIC_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_ORIGINSdoes not already containhttps://calendar.nachklang.art. It is a build-time value, so a restart does nothing.
The window between steps 3 and 4 does not look broken, which is the danger. The old Angular bundle starts by calling
POST /calendar/users/checkSessionValid, and those legacy routes are untouched - so it still succeeds and the page renders as signed in. What the user then sees is an empty event table and saves that silently do nothing. It looks like the calendar lost its data, not like a deploy in progress. Keep the gap to minutes, or take the frontend offline for it.One-way door: any iCal subscription whose URL carries
?sessionId=&sessionKey=rather than?password=stops working permanently. The shared-password URLs are unaffected. - The four write routes sit behind
-
Drop the legacy path. Implemented 2026-09-06 on
feature/calendar-drop-legacy-path; not yet deployed. Gated on step 4 being live, which it now is.What went:
src/models/calendar/users/in its entirety - registration, login, activation, both password-reset routes, and the session checking the feedback and tickets admin areas used to authenticate against - plus its mount inCalendar.router.ts. That was the API's last unauthenticated account-creation and mail-sending endpoint.- The two
LEFT OUTER JOIN usersclauses inevents.service.tsand thelegacy_*aliases they fed, along withcreated_by_id/version_created_by_idin the SELECT, the row mapper and theEventinterface. One name source remains besides the live admin lookup: the snapshot, which is what made this safe. X-Session-Id/X-Session-Keyfrom the CORSallowedHeaders. Nothing had read them since the tickets and feedback cutover, or sent them since this one.- The tripwire in
test/admin/auth-binding.tsasserting neither module fell back to a calendar header session. There is nothing left to fall back to.
DEFERRED_SECURITY.mditems 3 and 4 (activation and reset tokens never expiring) close with it - not by adding expiries but by deleting the code that issued them.Deploy checklist — note the order is REVERSED from step 4
Step 4's migration only added columns, so it went first.
004removes columns and a table that the currently running build still selects and joins, so running it first fails every calendar read including the public feed. The step 5 build references none of them and runs happily against the old schema. Therefore:-
Confirm the snapshot is complete. Both must return 0:
SELECT SUM(created_by_id IS NOT NULL AND created_by_name IS NULL) FROM events; SELECT SUM(version_created_by_id IS NOT NULL AND version_created_by_name IS NULL) FROM event_versions;A non-zero count is an event whose author
004would erase. Re-run 002's backfill first. -
Deploy the API. No frontend deploy is needed: the calendar frontend never read
createdById(itsEventmodel has only the name), and nothing else is known to. -
Confirm the calendar still works - the public feed, a signed-in read, and one save. At this point the old columns and tables still exist, unused, so this step is fully reversible by redeploying the previous build.
Note that
tscdoes not remove output for deleted sources, so a build over an existingdist/leavesdist/src/models/calendar/users/*.jsbehind. Nothing imports it and the routes 404, but the deployed artifact still contains the code - cleardist/in the pipeline if you want the artifact to match the source. -
Apply
sql/calendar/004_drop_legacy_auth.sql. This is the point of no return for the columns; the accounts themselves are only renamed aside. -
Optionally, later and at a quiet moment:
DROP TABLE sessions_legacy_archive, users_legacy_archive;
One-way door:
Event.createdByIdandlastModifiedByIdleave the API response. Check anything reading/calendar/events/*/jsonthat is not the calendar frontend.
What the code actually looks like (surveyed 2026-09-06)
Four things found while doing step 1 that change how the later steps should be built:
created_by_idis display-only. Nothing authorises on it.events.router.tsgates PUT, POST, DELETE and/moveonuser?.isActivealone - there is no "only the creator may edit" rule anywhere - and the column is read back solely to rendercreated_by_nameandlast_modified_by_name. That de-risks steps 2, 3 and 5 considerably: an event whose creator never gets re-invited loses a name in the UI, it does not become uneditable or invisible. It also means the step 2 backfill is best-effort, not a precondition.- The two schemas are separate databases.
nachklang_calendarandnachklang_adminhave their own connection pools (Calendar.db.tsvs the admin module's Kysely instance). So the bridging columns get no foreign key, and - the part the original sequence missed - theLEFT OUTER JOIN usersthat produces the creator's name cannot simply be repointed. It would have to become a cross-schema join, which hardcodes the admin database name into calendar SQL and ties the two schemas together exactly as an FK would. Recommendation for step 3: drop the join for the new path and resolve names in the service layer instead - collect the distinct ids from the result set and do one lookup against the admin users service. One extra query per listing, no coupling, and it keeps working if the admin database ever moves. events.created_by_idisNOT NULL. Step 5 cannot simply stop writing it; that step has to drop the column (and its FK tousers) in the same migration that stops the writes, or make it nullable first.- Every calendar read already hits the session table.
/:calendar/jsoncallsUserService.checkSessionbefore falling back tocredentials.service.ts, so the shared credentials are the fallback, not the primary path. Step 4 replaces the first half of that withrequireAppAccess('calendar')and has to decide what happens to the second half- which is the first open question below.
Open questions to settle before starting
Settled 2026-09-06:
- The shared calendar credentials keep working, but only for iCal. The web app goes
cookie-only at step 4;
MEMBER_CREDENTIALand friends survive onGET /calendar/events/{calendar}/ical, which is the one case where the client genuinely cannot send a cookie. Everything else incredentials.service.tsgoes with step 5.publicstays anonymous everywhere - see the note under step 4. - The iCal export keeps its own scheme. Same reasoning; it is the reason the shared credentials survive at all rather than an exception to their removal.
- No account backfill. See step 2 above.
- Pre-cutover authorship is archived, not discarded.
events.created_by_nameandevent_versions.version_created_by_name, backfilled once by migration 002 and never written again. This was originally listed as a step 5 question; it was brought forward so the data is safe well before the table that holds it is dropped.
Nothing is open. The last one - , the same INT
reference on the version rows - was handled in passing: step 1 gave it a sibling bridging
column, step 2 a sibling snapshot, and step 3 reads it exactly like event_versions.version_created_by_idevents.