d960ac8e24
A fresh-context review before deploying found two things that would have broken production, both in the runbook rather than the code. The deploy order named only migration 003. Production has none of the three - 001 and 002 were only ever applied to the dev database - and the new API reads the columns they add on every request, so following it literally would have 500'd every calendar call including the anonymous feed the public website uses. Step 4 now carries a numbered checklist with a verification query. APP_ORIGINS replaces the code's default list rather than adding to it, so naming calendar.nachklang.art in DEFAULT_APP_ORIGINS is not enough if that variable is set on the vhost - and its failure mode is the quiet one the config already warns about, where everything works except sign-out. Added to the same checklist. Also from the review: The two operands of the read guard on /json/next and /ical were swapped so the password check short-circuits first. They are side-effect free, so the order was free - but the old one put an admin-database query in front of the public feed for any caller holding a .nachklang.art cookie, which is a dependency that feed has never had. Two tests now assert the admin database is not consulted at all. /:calendar/json/next had no route-level test, despite being the endpoint the public website actually calls and the property named as load-bearing. Covered now, along with the rest of its credential matrix. Migrations 001 and 002 gained IF NOT EXISTS. They are applied by hand with no tracking table, so a partial re-run should be a no-op rather than an error that aborts the rest of the paste. Verified by applying all three twice to a throwaway container and diffing against the dev schema. Swagger: two descriptions still claimed authentication was required where the public calendar needs none, the calendar enum omitted `birthdays`, and a `createdBy` request-body field was documented and read but never persisted - misleading in a way that suggests a client can set authorship. Removed. The CORS comment describing the calendar's query-parameter sessions is no longer true and was rewritten. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
217 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
217 lines
14 KiB
Markdown
# Migrating the Calendar domain onto the admin identity module
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Status: **steps 1-4 implemented 2026-09-06, not yet merged or deployed.** Step 2 dropped by
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decision, part of step 5 brought forward. Only step 5, the removal of the legacy path, is
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left to write.
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> Read the deploy checklist under step 4 before applying anything. "Done" below means the
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> code exists on a branch, **not** that production has it - and in particular production has
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> none of the three migrations.
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Written 2026-09-05 alongside the admin module (step 2 of `docs/plan-admin-auth.md` in the
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nachklang-admin repo), which deliberately left the calendar alone. Steps 1-4 of that plan
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are now live, so the calendar is the last module still on the legacy query-parameter
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sessions.
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## Why the calendar was left out
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The admin module replaced authentication for feedback and tickets by swapping one
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middleware. The calendar cannot be done that way, because its user identity is woven into
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its data:
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- `users`/`sessions` live in the **calendar** database and are the same tables the
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feedback and tickets admin areas used to authenticate against.
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- `events.created_by_id` is an **INT** foreign key into `users.user_id`. The admin module's
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user ids are **VARCHAR(36)** strings. Migrating identity means migrating that column and
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every query that joins it.
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- The Angular frontend passes `sessionId`/`sessionKey` as **query parameters**
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(`DEFERRED_SECURITY.md` item 1). Cookie sessions remove the parameters entirely, so
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every calendar route signature and the frontend's HTTP layer change together.
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- `credentials.service.ts` implements a second, parallel authorisation model: the
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`MEMBER_CREDENTIAL` / `CHOIR_CREDENTIAL` / `MANAGEMENT_CREDENTIAL` shared secrets that
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let non-users read specific calendars. That has no equivalent in the admin module and is
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not a per-user permission at all.
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What already exists today: `calendar` is a value in the `user_app_permissions.app` enum, so
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permissions can be granted before anything else moves.
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## What is in place to build on
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- Cookie sessions across `*.nachklang.art`, and `requireAppAccess('calendar')` in
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`src/models/admin/admin.middleware.ts` - usable the moment a calendar route wants it.
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- `res.locals.admin` is `{id, email, displayName, apps}`; `id` is the string user id.
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- Invitations, disable/enable and session revocation already cover calendar users, because
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they are properties of the account rather than of an app.
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## Suggested sequence
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Each step is meant to leave production working on its own.
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1. **Add a bridging column.** ~~`ALTER TABLE events ADD COLUMN created_by_user_id
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VARCHAR(36) NULL`, indexed. Nothing reads it yet.~~ **Done 2026-09-06**, as
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`sql/calendar/001_add_admin_user_bridge.sql` - the first migration this repo owns for the
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calendar schema, mirrored into `docker/init/01-calendar-schema-dev.sql`. It covers both
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`events.created_by_user_id` and `event_versions.version_created_by_user_id`, and carries
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no foreign key (see "What the code actually looks like" below). The dev seed leaves two
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events on the legacy path and gives one an admin id, so step 3's dual-read has both cases
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to exercise. Verified by applying the pre-migration schema and then the migration to a
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throwaway MariaDB 11 container, and diffing `SHOW CREATE TABLE` against a fresh dev
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schema: identical. Applied to the running dev database on the same day; a dev container
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created before then needs it applied, or recreating.
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2. ~~**Map the accounts.**~~ **Dropped 2026-09-06.** There is no backfill: since the
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creator is only ever a display name (see below), old events keep resolving through the
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legacy join until step 5 and then simply lose the name. Re-inviting the people who
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actually still need calendar access remains an operational task, but it is no longer a
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migration step and nothing is blocked on it.
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3. **Dual-read.** ~~Change `events.service.ts` to prefer `created_by_user_id` and fall back
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to `created_by_id`. Writes fill both.~~ **Done 2026-09-06.** `events.service.ts` now reads
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both columns and prefers the admin one, resolving the name through a single
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`findDisplayNames` lookup against the admin database per result set (added to
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`users.admin.service.ts` for this). Four copies of the same SELECT and four copies of the
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row mapper were collapsed into one of each first - the dual read would otherwise have had
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to be written four times.
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A name now has three possible sources, tried weakest first: the legacy join, then the
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`created_by_name` snapshot from migration 002, then the live admin lookup - which wins
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because it is the only one that follows an account being renamed. An admin id that no
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longer resolves falls back rather than blanking, and a failure to reach the admin database
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is caught and logged rather than propagated, so an anonymous read of the public calendar
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never depends on the admin database being up. Covered by
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`test/calendar/events.service.test.ts`.
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**Writes are not dual-written**, contrary to the original plan: before the cutover the
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request only ever carries a legacy session, so there is no admin id available to write.
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Writes start filling `created_by_user_id` (and stop filling `created_by_id`) in step 4.
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4. **Switch the routes.** ~~Replace the query-parameter session checks in `events.router.ts`
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and `users.router.ts` with `requireAppAccess('calendar')`, and change the Angular frontend
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to `withCredentials: true`.~~ **Done 2026-09-06.** `DEFERRED_SECURITY.md` item 1 is closed:
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no route reads `sessionId`/`sessionKey` any more.
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How it came out, route by route:
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- The four write routes sit behind `requireAppAccess('calendar')` as middleware. They
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answer 401 when signed out and 403 without the permission, where they used to answer 403
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for both.
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- The three read routes cannot use middleware - the same URL serves an anonymous visitor,
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an iCal subscription holding a shared password, and a signed-in editor who should see
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drafts. They call `resolveAccess` optionally instead (`signedInEditor` in the router),
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and a signed-in user *without* the calendar permission is treated as anonymous rather
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than refused, so they keep their access to the public calendar.
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- `credentials.service.ts` lost its session half entirely and is now just the password
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table. `hasAccess(calendar, password)`.
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- `/calendar/users/*` was left alone. Nothing calls it and a session it mints opens
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nothing, but they are live password-accepting endpoints - step 5 removes them.
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Also: `calendar.nachklang.art` joined `DEFAULT_APP_ORIGINS` (better-auth `trustedOrigins`,
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without which sign-out from the calendar fails while everything else works), and
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`localhost:4200` joined the dev origins for the same reason.
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Two things this step had to carry that the original sequence put in step 5:
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- **`sql/calendar/003_allow_null_legacy_creator.sql` makes `events.created_by_id` nullable**
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(`MODIFY created_by_id INT NULL`). It is `NOT NULL` today, so the first event created after the
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cutover would otherwise fail to insert - there is no legacy int id to write any more.
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`event_versions.version_created_by_id` is already nullable. The foreign key can stay
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until step 5; it permits NULL. It also re-runs 002's idempotent name backfill, to catch
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anything created between the two migrations. Applying it early is safe - widening a
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column to accept NULL cannot break the running pre-cutover build.
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- **The public calendar stays anonymous.** `hasAccess('public')` returns true before any
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credential check, and nachklang.art reads `/calendar/events/public/json` and
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`/public/json/next` with no session at all. Pinned at both levels - the password table in
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`test/calendar/credentials.service.test.ts`, the routes themselves in
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`test/calendar/events.router.test.ts` - so this cannot regress quietly.
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### Deploy checklist
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Production has **none** of the three migrations: 001 and 002 were only ever applied to the
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dev database. The API build below selects `created_by_user_id` and `created_by_name` on
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every read, so deploying it against a database missing them fails every calendar request
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including the anonymous public feed the website uses. In order:
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1. **Apply `sql/calendar/001`, `002`, `003`, in that order**, against `CALENDAR_DB`. All
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three are re-runnable, so applying one that is already applied is a no-op. Verify
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before continuing:
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`SHOW COLUMNS FROM events LIKE '%by_user%'; SHOW COLUMNS FROM events LIKE '%by_name%';`
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- four rows across the two tables, and `created_by_id` nullable.
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2. **Check `APP_ORIGINS` on the API vhost.** `calendar.nachklang.art` is in the code's
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default list, but the environment variable *replaces* that list rather than adding to
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it - so if it is set at all (the tickets/feedback cutover may have set it), append
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`https://calendar.nachklang.art` or the calendar's sign-out will 403 while everything
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else works. That is the failure mode the comment in `admin.config.ts` warns about.
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3. **Deploy the API.**
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4. **Deploy the calendar frontend immediately after.** Do not leave a gap - see below.
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5. **Re-run 002's two `UPDATE` statements.** Between step 1 and step 3 the old API was
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still writing `created_by_id` with no snapshot; those few rows would otherwise lose
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their author at step 5.
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6. **Rebuild the admin app** if `NEXT_PUBLIC_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_ORIGINS` does not already
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contain `https://calendar.nachklang.art`. It is a **build-time** value, so a restart
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does nothing.
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**The window between steps 3 and 4 does not look broken, which is the danger.** The old
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Angular bundle starts by calling `POST /calendar/users/checkSessionValid`, and those
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legacy routes are untouched - so it still succeeds and the page renders as signed in. What
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the user then sees is an empty event table and saves that silently do nothing. It looks
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like the calendar lost its data, not like a deploy in progress. Keep the gap to minutes,
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or take the frontend offline for it.
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**One-way door:** any iCal subscription whose URL carries `?sessionId=&sessionKey=` rather
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than `?password=` stops working permanently. The shared-password URLs are unaffected.
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5. **Drop the legacy path.** Remove `users.service.ts`'s session handling, the `sessions`
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table, `created_by_id`, and the legacy half of the step 3 read (the `users` join and its
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`legacy_*` aliases - the snapshot fallback stays, it is what makes dropping the table
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safe). The names were archived ahead of time by
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`sql/calendar/002_snapshot_legacy_creator_names.sql`, so nothing is lost here. Legacy `/calendar/users/*` stays
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only if something still calls it - otherwise delete it too. `X-Session-Id` /
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`X-Session-Key` can then come out of the CORS `allowedHeaders` list in
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`src/app.factory.ts`.
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## What the code actually looks like (surveyed 2026-09-06)
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Four things found while doing step 1 that change how the later steps should be built:
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- **`created_by_id` is display-only.** Nothing authorises on it. `events.router.ts` gates
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PUT, POST, DELETE and `/move` on `user?.isActive` alone - there is no "only the creator may
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edit" rule anywhere - and the column is read back solely to render `created_by_name` and
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`last_modified_by_name`. That de-risks steps 2, 3 and 5 considerably: an event whose
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creator never gets re-invited loses a name in the UI, it does not become uneditable or
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invisible. It also means the step 2 backfill is best-effort, not a precondition.
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- **The two schemas are separate databases.** `nachklang_calendar` and `nachklang_admin`
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have their own connection pools (`Calendar.db.ts` vs the admin module's Kysely instance).
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So the bridging columns get no foreign key, and - the part the original sequence missed -
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**the `LEFT OUTER JOIN users` that produces the creator's name cannot simply be repointed**.
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It would have to become a cross-schema join, which hardcodes the admin database name into
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calendar SQL and ties the two schemas together exactly as an FK would. Recommendation for
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step 3: drop the join for the new path and resolve names in the service layer instead -
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collect the distinct ids from the result set and do one lookup against the admin users
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service. One extra query per listing, no coupling, and it keeps working if the admin
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database ever moves.
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- **`events.created_by_id` is `NOT NULL`.** Step 5 cannot simply stop writing it; that step
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has to drop the column (and its FK to `users`) in the same migration that stops the writes,
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or make it nullable first.
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- **Every calendar read already hits the session table.** `/:calendar/json` calls
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`UserService.checkSession` before falling back to `credentials.service.ts`, so the shared
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credentials are the *fallback*, not the primary path. Step 4 replaces the first half of
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that with `requireAppAccess('calendar')` and has to decide what happens to the second half
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- which is the first open question below.
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## Open questions to settle before starting
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**Settled 2026-09-06:**
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- **The shared calendar credentials keep working, but only for iCal.** The web app goes
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cookie-only at step 4; `MEMBER_CREDENTIAL` and friends survive on
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`GET /calendar/events/{calendar}/ical`, which is the one case where the client genuinely
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cannot send a cookie. Everything else in `credentials.service.ts` goes with step 5.
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`public` stays anonymous everywhere - see the note under step 4.
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- **The iCal export keeps its own scheme.** Same reasoning; it is the reason the shared
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credentials survive at all rather than an exception to their removal.
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- **No account backfill.** See step 2 above.
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- **Pre-cutover authorship is archived, not discarded.** `events.created_by_name` and
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`event_versions.version_created_by_name`, backfilled once by migration 002 and never
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written again. This was originally listed as a step 5 question; it was brought forward so
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the data is safe well before the table that holds it is dropped.
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**Nothing is open.** The last one - ~~`event_versions.version_created_by_id`~~, the same INT
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reference on the version rows - was handled in passing: step 1 gave it a sibling bridging
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column, step 2 a sibling snapshot, and step 3 reads it exactly like `events`.
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